PUP.FastViewer
Table of Contents
Analysis Report
General information
| Family Name: | PUP.FastViewer |
|---|---|
| Packers: | PECompact v2.20 |
| Signature status: | Root Not Trusted |
Known Samples
Known Samples
This section lists other file samples believed to be associated with this family.|
MD5:
b20319625434effad0caab530263b07a
SHA1:
a98ee925974d75b12284751a195a7fa2bab7b744
SHA256:
3B91ABF275A2E46E26F79BBFC385D126AC8E99CFABD350CA9B1AADFDC4262580
File Size:
645.58 KB, 645584 bytes
|
|
MD5:
b0bbb36530338386c1ab6a0d4c014144
SHA1:
4059108c27d1ad9108edde92536e995263c88a19
SHA256:
4381BD5F4527FE779272D53AD7096989BFD3E1ED6331CF3151C155298C4D2F10
File Size:
1.58 MB, 1579064 bytes
|
|
MD5:
1a148bd3387f974d463654438bbf13d0
SHA1:
2e319279dfa30fae75ac2c73ca12c6d8ec381fd7
SHA256:
AAAB6DFB28E091100543C84741C53D9E38CBEA8CB7C79254AC81240DE8B701C2
File Size:
512.48 KB, 512480 bytes
|
Windows Portable Executable Attributes
- File doesn't have "Rich" header
- File doesn't have debug information
- File doesn't have exports table
- File doesn't have relocations information
- File has been packed
- File has exports table
- File is 32-bit executable
- File is either console or GUI application
- File is GUI application (IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_GUI)
- File is Native application (NOT .NET application)
Show More
- IMAGE_FILE_DLL is not set inside PE header (Executable)
- IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE is set inside PE header (Executable Image)
File Icons
File Icons
This section displays icon resources found within family samples. Malware often replicates icons commonly associated with legitimate software to mislead users into believing the malware is safe.
Windows PE Version Information
Windows PE Version Information
This section displays values and attributes that have been set in the Windows file version information data structure for samples within this family. To mislead users, malware actors often add fake version information mimicking legitimate software.| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| Company Name | Fastviewer.com |
| File Description |
|
| File Version |
|
| Internal Name |
|
| Legal Copyright |
|
| Original Filename |
|
| Product Name | FastViewer |
| Product Version |
|
Digital Signatures
Digital Signatures
This section lists digital signatures that are attached to samples within this family. When analyzing and verifying digital signatures, it is important to confirm that the signature’s root authority is a well-known and trustworthy entity and that the status of the signature is good. Malware is often signed with non-trustworthy “Self Signed” digital signatures (which can be easily created by a malware author with no verification). Malware may also be signed by legitimate signatures that have an invalid status, and by signatures from questionable root authorities with fake or misleading “Signer” names.| Signer | Root | Status |
|---|---|---|
| FastViewer GmbH und Co KG | Thawte Premium Server CA | Root Not Trusted |
Block Information
Block Information
During analysis, EnigmaSoft breaks file samples into logical blocks for classification and comparison with other samples. Blocks can be used to generate malware detection rules and to group file samples into families based on shared source code, functionality and other distinguishing attributes and characteristics. This section lists a summary of this block data, as well as its classification by EnigmaSoft. A visual representation of the block data is also displayed, where available.| Total Blocks: | 3,452 |
|---|---|
| Potentially Malicious Blocks: | 65 |
| Whitelisted Blocks: | 951 |
| Unknown Blocks: | 2,436 |
Visual Map
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Data truncated
0 - Probable Safe Block
? - Unknown Block
x - Potentially Malicious Block
? - Unknown Block
x - Potentially Malicious Block
Registry Modifications
Registry Modifications
This section lists registry keys and values that were created, modified and/or deleted by samples in this family. Windows Registry activity can provide valuable insight into malware functionality. Additionally, malware often creates registry values to allow itself to automatically start and indefinitely persist after an initial infection has compromised the system.| Key::Value | Data | API Name |
|---|---|---|
| HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\internet settings\zonemap::proxybypass | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\internet settings\zonemap::intranetname | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\internet settings\zonemap::uncasintranet | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\internet settings\zonemap::autodetect | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKLM\system\controlset001\services\bam\state\usersettings\s-1-5-21-3119368278-1123331430-659265220-1001::\device\harddiskvolume2\windows\system32\conhost.exe | 緁聙偯ǜ | RegNtPreCreateKey |
| HKLM\system\controlset001\services\bam\state\usersettings\s-1-5-21-3119368278-1123331430-659265220-1001::\device\harddiskvolume2\windows\system32\conhost.exe | ȑ胀偯ǜ | RegNtPreCreateKey |
Windows API Usage
Windows API Usage
This section lists Windows API calls that are used by the samples in this family. Windows API usage analysis is a valuable tool that can help identify malicious activity, such as keylogging, security privilege escalation, data encryption, data exfiltration, interference with antivirus software, and network request manipulation.| Category | API |
|---|---|
| Anti Debug |
|
| User Data Access |
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| Keyboard Access |
|
| Process Manipulation Evasion |
|
| Process Shell Execute |
|
| Syscall Use |
Show More
|
| Process Terminate |
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Shell Command Execution
Shell Command Execution
This section lists Windows shell commands that are run by the samples in this family. Windows Shell commands are often leveraged by malware for nefarious purposes and can be used to elevate security privileges, download and launch other malware, exploit vulnerabilities, collect and exfiltrate data, and hide malicious activity.
open C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /c del "C:\Users\Ecggpgmz\\fvw.2009-??-??T??-??-??.stream.bin"
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open C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /c del "C:\Users\Ecggpgmz\\fvw.2009-??-??T??-??-??.report.txt"
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WriteConsole: Could Not Find C
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