PUP.QQPC
Table of Contents
Analysis Report
General information
| Family Name: | PUP.QQPC |
|---|---|
| Signature status: | Self Signed |
Known Samples
Known Samples
This section lists other file samples believed to be associated with this family.|
MD5:
6abadab81b7c9f7d807bb5884b70b554
SHA1:
77e54d18d45b80dc7df31c14b4992f7ce41d70d0
SHA256:
F5E8CC5DDAD0EEF9178D2775F5FD946BFB0163E2432E8D96B1E84E01C77F965E
File Size:
1.67 MB, 1669552 bytes
|
|
MD5:
0924c95c3c3f6a8b45f020a4b9e23217
SHA1:
c51203c2ac7fad4794a9e52c629068d447001924
SHA256:
79D9B01E3A174DF85BB0B8D32674F6C8FA865A98D34CA05F290534420402F36A
File Size:
1.27 MB, 1271688 bytes
|
|
MD5:
06a3d1998369e4c8f11bd5869effc5e3
SHA1:
747883a9b8bee88b958f239aa071fd01c02e912b
SHA256:
35BA6A1A2FEDEDE1CCA81AFBCCCB18E82DFC4C2F621186B41740D0D8C598C5F3
File Size:
1.17 MB, 1167264 bytes
|
|
MD5:
d3891b9c0068850d3448597fbe7fe751
SHA1:
41e2ef0a0b884ca914f79b5e1c275b59db4c8c7b
SHA256:
D6F58C316A90946B7F7BFBEDD6FA9F5F9663D0A83F77BE55766D4DE4961B0433
File Size:
555.71 KB, 555712 bytes
|
|
MD5:
05b8eca0313f831093bdc7c8a419a084
SHA1:
a565e8e2721ae3960e5ba6795c856fcee8dc877a
SHA256:
8386A730C19183FAE4B5E4B2BA2AF4685B8711C6E00077CB29772027103B7DC1
File Size:
680.39 KB, 680392 bytes
|
Show More
|
MD5:
0e20557c46f626f4f42e88596b41ba95
SHA1:
3bf0fa77a4f8e06ba498a9c10aaadda875b422a2
SHA256:
29AA30AFCE0334DE16197B2C2A5310700B9CDA64FE502A0532487BB074F4145F
File Size:
733.62 KB, 733616 bytes
|
|
MD5:
1039fb74f1a6b6c2b409f95cc6dbb6ec
SHA1:
0059095f3795c5c4be7227be114065cabd8ca904
SHA256:
515000718A09A9F522412754F30A5AA81F5ABA7C262DD19876248C0BD0653A24
File Size:
1.64 MB, 1643912 bytes
|
|
MD5:
b75703868db96217c9709a5bfe78cd12
SHA1:
f2686a26ce96e7c08a3c2bfde72725ad652d1915
SHA256:
1AF20773D71C6E67C3727099A06C4A1F958FDB0764D8231748B70AA7A486D2B4
File Size:
8.01 MB, 8011776 bytes
|
|
MD5:
e499dbe261ea2341ced7bc0f49c37614
SHA1:
43df5a63fdb9d2d8fb80632152cac58300934774
SHA256:
C74B875E6488273C47AEB2B9BFC0BD46F0E1A45B5B875E14BE9DFF35FD6E8002
File Size:
1.17 MB, 1167264 bytes
|
Windows Portable Executable Attributes
- File doesn't have "Rich" header
- File doesn't have exports table
- File doesn't have security information
- File has exports table
- File has TLS information
- File is 32-bit executable
- File is either console or GUI application
- File is GUI application (IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_GUI)
- File is Native application (NOT .NET application)
- File is not packed
Show More
- IMAGE_FILE_DLL is not set inside PE header (Executable)
- IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE is set inside PE header (Executable Image)
File Icons
File Icons
This section displays icon resources found within family samples. Malware often replicates icons commonly associated with legitimate software to mislead users into believing the malware is safe.
Windows PE Version Information
Windows PE Version Information
This section displays values and attributes that have been set in the Windows file version information data structure for samples within this family. To mislead users, malware actors often add fake version information mimicking legitimate software.| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| Cip Ver | 10016 |
| Comments | 2014-07-16 00:00:00 |
| Company Name |
|
| Company Short Name | Tencent |
| File Description |
|
| File Version |
|
| Internal Name |
|
| Kernel Build | 129 |
| Kernel Version | 53.0.2785.104 |
| Last Change | 713bc9f76cb50125fdd45c5a1681158adfff5709 |
| Legal Copyright |
|
| Official Build | 1 |
| Original Filename |
|
| Private Build | 10016 |
| Product Name |
|
| Product Short Name |
|
| Product Version |
|
| Special Build | 1023 |
| Url Ver | 1 |
Digital Signatures
Digital Signatures
This section lists digital signatures that are attached to samples within this family. When analyzing and verifying digital signatures, it is important to confirm that the signature’s root authority is a well-known and trustworthy entity and that the status of the signature is good. Malware is often signed with non-trustworthy “Self Signed” digital signatures (which can be easily created by a malware author with no verification). Malware may also be signed by legitimate signatures that have an invalid status, and by signatures from questionable root authorities with fake or misleading “Signer” names.| Signer | Root | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Tencent Technology(Shenzhen) Company Limited | DigiCert Assured ID Code Signing CA-1 | Self Signed |
| Tencent Technology(Shenzhen) Company Limited | DigiCert SHA2 Assured ID Code Signing CA | Self Signed |
| Tencent Technology(Shenzhen) Company Limited | Symantec Class 3 SHA256 Code Signing CA | Self Signed |
| Tencent Technology(Shenzhen) Company Limited | VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2010 CA | Self Signed |
File Traits
- 7-zip (In Overlay)
- 7-zip SFX
- HighEntropy
- No Version Info
- WriteProcessMemory
- x86
Block Information
Block Information
During analysis, EnigmaSoft breaks file samples into logical blocks for classification and comparison with other samples. Blocks can be used to generate malware detection rules and to group file samples into families based on shared source code, functionality and other distinguishing attributes and characteristics. This section lists a summary of this block data, as well as its classification by EnigmaSoft. A visual representation of the block data is also displayed, where available.| Total Blocks: | 4,003 |
|---|---|
| Potentially Malicious Blocks: | 174 |
| Whitelisted Blocks: | 3,828 |
| Unknown Blocks: | 1 |
Visual Map
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0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
x
x
0
x
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
...
Data truncated
0 - Probable Safe Block
? - Unknown Block
x - Potentially Malicious Block
? - Unknown Block
x - Potentially Malicious Block
Similar Families
Similar Families
This section lists other families that share similarities with this family, based on EnigmaSoft’s analysis. Many malware families are created from the same malware toolkits and use the same packing and encryption techniques but uniquely extend functionality. Similar families may also share source code, attributes, icons, subcomponents, compromised and/or invalid digital signatures, and network characteristics. Researchers leverage these similarities to rapidly and effectively triage file samples and extend malware detection rules.- Patched.E
Files Modified
Files Modified
This section lists files that were created, modified, moved and/or deleted by samples in this family. File system activity can provide valuable insight into how malware functions on the operating system.| File | Attributes |
|---|---|
| \device\harddisk0\dr0 | Generic Read,Write Data,Write Attributes,Write extended,Append data |
| c:\programdata\tencent\qqpcmgr\qqpcmgrinstall_20260204142436.log | Generic Write,Read Attributes |
| c:\users\user\appdata\roaming\tencent\deskupdate\globalmgr.db | Generic Read,Write Data,Write Attributes,Write extended,Append data |
| c:\users\user\appdata\roaming\tencent\qqbrowser\liveuplog\2025-08-30 02_16_24.log | Generic Write,Read Attributes |
| c:\users\user\appdata\roaming\tencent\qqbrowser\liveuplog\2026-02-07 16_12_57.log | Generic Write,Read Attributes |
Registry Modifications
Registry Modifications
This section lists registry keys and values that were created, modified and/or deleted by samples in this family. Windows Registry activity can provide valuable insight into malware functionality. Additionally, malware often creates registry values to allow itself to automatically start and indefinitely persist after an initial infection has compromised the system.| Key::Value | Data | API Name |
|---|---|---|
| HKCU\software\microsoft\internet explorer\browsermachinecode::machineguid | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKCU\software\tencent\qqbrowser\liveup::lur | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKCU\software\microsoft\internet explorer\browsermachinecode::machineguid | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKCU\software\microsoft\internet explorer\browsermachinecode::machineguid | RegNtPreCreateKey |
Windows API Usage
Windows API Usage
This section lists Windows API calls that are used by the samples in this family. Windows API usage analysis is a valuable tool that can help identify malicious activity, such as keylogging, security privilege escalation, data encryption, data exfiltration, interference with antivirus software, and network request manipulation.| Category | API |
|---|---|
| Other Suspicious |
|
| Anti Debug |
|
| Network Info Queried |
|
| Network Winhttp |
|
| Process Manipulation Evasion |
|
| Network Winsock2 |
|
| Network Winsock |
|
