Backdoor.Quasar.BB
Table of Contents
Analysis Report
General information
| Family Name: | Backdoor.Quasar.BB |
|---|---|
| Signature status: | Hash Mismatch |
Known Samples
Known Samples
This section lists other file samples believed to be associated with this family.|
MD5:
7b47639530528a9f06cbea830b31f62d
SHA1:
fec342f4705a1f4751230dab741c3e27208c71b8
SHA256:
87DA853EEAEF7E7B360930E878FD8BAAFB681E0A969F2F84C9483C498501080F
File Size:
992.26 KB, 992256 bytes
|
|
MD5:
0d1e20c4d40f8fbb8570d8610c18b7c5
SHA1:
066dde1a5c03ed8898a42a495b5a623c69b4b96e
SHA256:
64BFB8E28F421328D917945E6F69E0F0CC66138FEBEEC2DB9FFBBCEFCE1D6064
File Size:
1.76 MB, 1763880 bytes
|
Windows Portable Executable Attributes
- File doesn't have "Rich" header
- File doesn't have debug information
- File doesn't have exports table
- File doesn't have security information
- File has TLS information
- File is 64-bit executable
- File is either console or GUI application
- File is GUI application (IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_GUI)
- File is Native application (NOT .NET application)
- File is not packed
Show More
- IMAGE_FILE_DLL is not set inside PE header (Executable)
- IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE is set inside PE header (Executable Image)
Windows PE Version Information
Windows PE Version Information
This section displays values and attributes that have been set in the Windows file version information data structure for samples within this family. To mislead users, malware actors often add fake version information mimicking legitimate software.| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| Company Name | Microsoft Corporation |
| File Description |
|
| File Version |
|
| Internal Name |
|
| Legal Copyright | © Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. |
| Original Filename |
|
| Product Name |
|
| Product Version |
|
Digital Signatures
Digital Signatures
This section lists digital signatures that are attached to samples within this family. When analyzing and verifying digital signatures, it is important to confirm that the signature’s root authority is a well-known and trustworthy entity and that the status of the signature is good. Malware is often signed with non-trustworthy “Self Signed” digital signatures (which can be easily created by a malware author with no verification). Malware may also be signed by legitimate signatures that have an invalid status, and by signatures from questionable root authorities with fake or misleading “Signer” names.| Signer | Root | Status |
|---|---|---|
| NVIDIA Corporation | DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA384 2021 CA1 | Hash Mismatch |
File Traits
- 2+ executable sections
- HighEntropy
- x64
Block Information
Block Information
During analysis, EnigmaSoft breaks file samples into logical blocks for classification and comparison with other samples. Blocks can be used to generate malware detection rules and to group file samples into families based on shared source code, functionality and other distinguishing attributes and characteristics. This section lists a summary of this block data, as well as its classification by EnigmaSoft. A visual representation of the block data is also displayed, where available.| Total Blocks: | 7,188 |
|---|---|
| Potentially Malicious Blocks: | 1,577 |
| Whitelisted Blocks: | 3,237 |
| Unknown Blocks: | 2,374 |
Visual Map
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
x
0
x
0
?
0
?
?
x
?
?
0
?
0
0
x
?
0
x
x
0
?
?
0
?
0
0
0
0
x
x
x
x
?
0
0
0
?
0
x
x
?
?
?
0
?
0
?
?
x
0
0
?
?
0
?
0
?
?
?
0
?
0
?
x
?
0
?
x
0
0
x
0
?
0
?
x
?
0
x
0
x
x
x
?
?
x
x
?
0
?
0
x
x
0
?
0
?
x
0
x
0
?
0
?
?
0
x
x
x
0
x
x
?
x
x
?
?
?
x
x
?
?
x
0
0
?
0
x
0
?
0
x
x
x
0
x
?
0
0
x
0
?
x
?
?
?
0
?
?
0
?
0
x
x
x
?
x
x
x
x
x
0
?
x
?
x
0
?
0
x
?
?
x
?
0
0
x
x
x
0
0
?
?
0
0
x
x
?
?
?
x
x
0
?
x
0
?
?
?
x
0
?
0
x
?
x
x
?
x
?
?
0
?
?
0
x
0
0
?
?
0
?
0
x
?
?
x
?
?
?
x
?
x
?
?
x
x
0
?
?
0
0
x
?
0
0
x
?
?
x
?
x
?
?
?
x
?
?
x
0
0
0
0
0
?
x
0
0
x
0
0
0
x
x
0
x
?
?
x
x
0
?
?
0
?
x
x
x
0
x
0
?
?
x
x
x
x
x
x
0
?
x
?
0
0
?
?
?
0
?
0
0
x
?
?
?
0
0
x
x
x
?
0
?
x
0
x
?
0
?
0
0
0
0
?
?
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
x
x
x
0
x
?
0
x
x
?
0
?
0
x
?
?
?
0
x
?
?
?
0
?
0
?
x
?
x
x
0
0
0
x
?
x
?
?
?
0
x
x
x
0
?
x
?
0
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
0
x
x
?
x
0
x
x
x
0
x
0
x
x
?
?
x
x
0
?
0
?
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
0
0
x
?
x
0
?
?
0
0
?
?
x
?
0
x
x
0
0
?
x
?
0
0
?
0
0
?
0
0
0
x
0
x
?
x
?
0
?
0
?
?
?
?
0
?
0
?
0
0
?
x
0
0
?
x
0
x
x
x
?
0
?
x
x
0
?
?
?
0
x
?
?
?
?
0
?
x
?
?
?
0
0
?
?
0
?
?
x
0
?
0
x
0
x
0
x
0
x
0
x
?
?
0
x
0
?
0
?
x
?
0
?
?
0
?
0
0
x
?
0
0
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
x
?
0
x
x
0
x
0
x
0
?
x
0
?
0
0
?
?
x
0
?
?
0
?
0
0
x
?
0
0
?
?
x
x
0
x
0
x
0
0
?
x
0
0
0
x
x
x
0
?
?
?
0
x
x
0
?
0
?
0
x
x
0
x
x
?
0
x
?
x
0
?
0
?
?
0
0
?
x
0
?
?
0
0
x
x
?
x
0
?
x
0
0
?
x
?
?
?
0
?
?
0
0
x
?
0
x
0
0
?
x
?
x
x
?
0
x
0
0
0
x
x
0
?
x
x
0
?
0
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
x
0
?
?
0
0
?
x
?
?
0
x
0
0
x
x
0
?
x
?
0
0
x
?
?
?
0
x
x
0
?
x
0
0
?
x
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
?
?
0
x
0
?
0
x
?
0
?
?
0
x
x
?
0
0
x
?
x
0
0
0
0
x
0
x
?
0
?
0
?
x
0
?
x
?
x
?
0
x
x
x
0
x
x
x
x
0
0
?
x
?
x
?
x
0
0
?
?
0
0
0
0
?
x
?
0
?
x
0
?
0
x
0
x
0
x
?
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
0
0
?
?
0
x
x
x
?
0
?
?
?
0
?
?
0
0
?
0
0
0
x
x
?
?
0
x
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
0
?
0
?
0
?
0
?
?
x
?
0
0
?
?
?
?
0
?
0
0
0
?
0
0
x
x
x
?
0
x
x
?
?
?
0
0
0
x
0
0
x
?
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
0
?
x
x
?
?
?
?
0
?
x
0
?
?
x
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
x
x
0
?
?
x
?
?
0
x
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
x
x
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
?
?
x
x
0
x
0
x
0
?
?
?
?
?
x
?
x
?
?
?
0
?
?
0
0
0
x
0
?
x
?
0
?
0
0
?
x
0
?
x
?
?
x
x
0
?
?
?
0
?
x
?
0
?
x
x
?
0
0
0
?
0
0
?
x
0
0
0
?
?
?
0
0
?
x
?
?
x
x
0
x
?
0
x
?
x
x
x
x
?
0
x
?
x
?
?
?
x
0
x
0
0
0
x
0
?
?
x
x
0
?
0
?
0
x
?
0
0
x
0
?
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
x
?
?
0
x
?
?
0
0
0
x
x
x
?
x
?
?
0
?
0
0
0
0
?
?
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
0
x
?
x
x
x
?
0
0
x
?
x
x
?
?
x
?
x
?
0
?
x
0
x
0
0
?
0
x
x
x
0
?
x
x
x
x
0
0
?
0
0
?
x
?
0
?
0
0
0
?
0
?
x
0
?
0
0
?
?
0
x
?
?
x
0
x
0
?
x
x
0
x
0
?
0
?
0
?
0
x
0
0
0
x
0
x
0
0
x
x
0
x
0
x
0
?
?
0
?
x
0
0
0
x
x
?
?
?
?
0
?
?
x
0
0
?
x
0
?
0
0
x
x
?
x
0
x
?
x
0
?
?
?
?
0
0
x
x
?
0
x
0
?
x
x
0
0
x
?
?
0
x
x
x
?
0
x
0
?
?
?
?
?
x
0
0
?
?
?
0
?
?
0
x
0
x
?
0
?
x
0
0
?
0
?
0
0
0
0
?
x
0
?
?
?
?
?
x
?
x
0
?
0
0
0
0
?
x
0
0
?
0
?
0
?
0
?
x
?
x
?
?
?
?
?
x
?
?
0
x
?
0
?
0
x
x
0
?
?
0
?
0
x
x
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
x
?
0
?
x
?
x
?
?
?
0
?
?
0
0
0
0
x
x
0
?
0
0
0
0
?
x
0
0
?
0
0
0
0
x
x
0
?
?
x
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
0
?
0
?
x
?
0
0
0
0
?
x
0
0
?
x
0
?
?
0
?
0
0
0
0
?
?
x
0
?
0
x
?
?
0
0
?
x
x
?
?
?
?
x
0
0
?
0
?
x
x
x
?
x
0
x
x
?
?
0
0
0
0
x
x
0
x
?
x
0
x
0
x
0
?
0
x
x
0
?
0
0
x
0
x
?
x
x
?
?
0
x
?
0
x
0
?
0
x
0
x
?
0
x
0
0
0
?
x
?
0
?
0
x
?
0
x
?
?
x
x
?
?
x
x
?
0
?
0
0
x
0
0
0
x
x
?
?
?
0
x
?
?
x
x
x
0
?
?
?
0
0
x
x
?
x
x
0
0
x
?
?
x
?
0
?
?
x
?
x
0
0
0
?
?
0
?
x
?
?
?
?
?
x
?
x
0
0
0
x
0
0
x
?
?
0
?
?
0
x
0
?
0
0
0
?
x
?
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
?
0
?
0
x
?
?
x
0
x
?
0
?
0
0
0
?
?
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
x
x
0
0
x
x
0
x
?
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
0
?
x
x
?
0
0
0
0
0
x
0
?
x
?
x
x
?
?
0
x
0
x
?
0
0
?
x
0
x
0
0
0
?
x
?
0
x
0
?
?
?
0
0
?
0
0
?
?
x
0
x
?
?
?
0
?
?
0
?
0
?
x
0
x
?
x
x
0
?
0
?
0
?
?
x
0
?
?
?
?
0
?
?
0
?
0
0
x
?
0
x
?
0
0
0
0
?
x
?
?
?
x
0
?
x
0
x
?
x
0
0
?
0
?
0
?
0
x
0
?
?
0
x
?
?
0
?
x
?
0
?
0
x
0
0
?
x
?
?
?
?
0
0
?
0
?
x
?
0
?
0
0
0
x
?
x
0
0
?
0
x
?
0
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
x
?
0
?
0
0
0
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
x
x
?
x
0
0
?
?
0
?
x
0
?
0
0
x
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
0
0
?
?
x
0
x
?
?
x
?
?
0
?
x
?
?
?
?
?
?
x
x
0
x
0
x
0
0
?
0
?
0
0
0
0
x
?
0
?
x
x
0
x
?
0
0
?
0
0
?
0
x
0
0
0
0
x
0
?
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
0
0
?
x
x
0
x
?
x
0
0
0
?
?
?
0
0
?
x
x
x
0
x
x
x
?
0
?
0
?
0
?
x
x
0
?
0
x
?
?
?
x
0
?
0
?
?
0
0
x
0
?
0
0
?
x
?
x
?
0
x
x
0
0
0
?
0
?
0
0
0
x
?
0
x
?
0
0
0
0
?
0
x
x
0
0
0
x
0
x
0
x
?
0
?
0
0
x
0
x
0
0
?
?
?
?
x
x
?
x
0
0
0
0
?
x
0
?
x
x
?
?
?
x
0
0
x
0
?
x
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
x
0
x
x
?
...
Data truncated
0 - Probable Safe Block
? - Unknown Block
x - Potentially Malicious Block
? - Unknown Block
x - Potentially Malicious Block
Similar Families
Similar Families
This section lists other families that share similarities with this family, based on EnigmaSoft’s analysis. Many malware families are created from the same malware toolkits and use the same packing and encryption techniques but uniquely extend functionality. Similar families may also share source code, attributes, icons, subcomponents, compromised and/or invalid digital signatures, and network characteristics. Researchers leverage these similarities to rapidly and effectively triage file samples and extend malware detection rules.- CobaltStrike.SVA
Windows API Usage
Windows API Usage
This section lists Windows API calls that are used by the samples in this family. Windows API usage analysis is a valuable tool that can help identify malicious activity, such as keylogging, security privilege escalation, data encryption, data exfiltration, interference with antivirus software, and network request manipulation.| Category | API |
|---|---|
| Syscall Use |
Show More
|
