Backdoor.MSIL.Agent.XFC
Table of Contents
Analysis Report
General information
| Family Name: | Backdoor.MSIL.Agent.XFC |
|---|---|
| Signature status: | Hash Mismatch |
Known Samples
Known Samples
This section lists other file samples believed to be associated with this family.|
MD5:
d8ece2f5e1d6ec0438bcb4a675a41781
SHA1:
e97301ab743b5f7f510dcc1a9f35b88bb16197a7
SHA256:
9B18FAC62EA6D14F3C415E4B474D69BFBA9B78668010EC921457F8EE597DAF7E
File Size:
2.58 MB, 2581904 bytes
|
Windows Portable Executable Attributes
- File doesn't have "Rich" header
- File doesn't have debug information
- File doesn't have exports table
- File is .NET application
- File is 32-bit executable
- File is either console or GUI application
- File is GUI application (IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_GUI)
- File is not packed
- IMAGE_FILE_DLL is not set inside PE header (Executable)
- IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE is set inside PE header (Executable Image)
File Icons
File Icons
This section displays icon resources found within family samples. Malware often replicates icons commonly associated with legitimate software to mislead users into believing the malware is safe.
Windows PE Version Information
Windows PE Version Information
This section displays values and attributes that have been set in the Windows file version information data structure for samples within this family. To mislead users, malware actors often add fake version information mimicking legitimate software.| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| Assembly Version | 7.0.8.6879 |
| Comments | VirtualBox Web Service |
| Company Name | Oracle and/or its affiliates |
| File Description | VirtualBox Web Service |
| File Version | 7.0.8.6879 |
| Internal Name | Eqanqpez.exe |
| Legal Copyright | Copyright (C) 2009-2023 Oracle Corporation |
| Original Filename | Eqanqpez.exe |
| Product Name | Oracle VM VirtualBox |
| Product Version | 7.0.8.6879 |
Digital Signatures
Digital Signatures
This section lists digital signatures that are attached to samples within this family. When analyzing and verifying digital signatures, it is important to confirm that the signature’s root authority is a well-known and trustworthy entity and that the status of the signature is good. Malware is often signed with non-trustworthy “Self Signed” digital signatures (which can be easily created by a malware author with no verification). Malware may also be signed by legitimate signatures that have an invalid status, and by signatures from questionable root authorities with fake or misleading “Signer” names.| Signer | Root | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Oracle Corporation | DigiCert Assured ID Root CA | Hash Mismatch |
| Oracle Corporation | VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5 | Hash Mismatch |
File Traits
- .NET
- big overlay
- HighEntropy
- x86
Block Information
Block Information
During analysis, EnigmaSoft breaks file samples into logical blocks for classification and comparison with other samples. Blocks can be used to generate malware detection rules and to group file samples into families based on shared source code, functionality and other distinguishing attributes and characteristics. This section lists a summary of this block data, as well as its classification by EnigmaSoft. A visual representation of the block data is also displayed, where available.| Total Blocks: | 1,613 |
|---|---|
| Potentially Malicious Blocks: | 181 |
| Whitelisted Blocks: | 368 |
| Unknown Blocks: | 1,064 |
Visual Map
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0 - Probable Safe Block
? - Unknown Block
x - Potentially Malicious Block
? - Unknown Block
x - Potentially Malicious Block
Files Modified
Files Modified
This section lists files that were created, modified, moved and/or deleted by samples in this family. File system activity can provide valuable insight into how malware functions on the operating system.| File | Attributes |
|---|---|
| c:\users\user\appdata\local\microsoft\windows\usrclass.dat{dba6b5ef-640a-11ed-9bcb-f677369d361c}.txr.0.regtrans-ms | Generic Read,Write Data,Write Attributes,Write extended,Append data |
| c:\users\user\appdata\local\microsoft\windows\usrclass.dat{dba6b5ef-640a-11ed-9bcb-f677369d361c}.txr.1.regtrans-ms | Generic Read,Write Data,Write Attributes,Write extended,Append data |
| c:\users\user\appdata\local\microsoft\windows\usrclass.dat{dba6b5ef-640a-11ed-9bcb-f677369d361c}.txr.2.regtrans-ms | Generic Read,Write Data,Write Attributes,Write extended,Append data |
Registry Modifications
Registry Modifications
This section lists registry keys and values that were created, modified and/or deleted by samples in this family. Windows Registry activity can provide valuable insight into malware functionality. Additionally, malware often creates registry values to allow itself to automatically start and indefinitely persist after an initial infection has compromised the system.| Key::Value | Data | API Name |
|---|---|---|
| HKLM\system\controlset001\services\bam\state\usersettings\s-1-5-21-3119368278-1123331430-659265220-1001::\device\harddiskvolume2\windows\system32\conhost.exe | 沖휽ǜ | RegNtPreCreateKey |
Windows API Usage
Windows API Usage
This section lists Windows API calls that are used by the samples in this family. Windows API usage analysis is a valuable tool that can help identify malicious activity, such as keylogging, security privilege escalation, data encryption, data exfiltration, interference with antivirus software, and network request manipulation.| Category | API |
|---|---|
| User Data Access |
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| Encryption Used |
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| Anti Debug |
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| Other Suspicious |
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| Process Terminate |
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| Process Shell Execute |
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| Syscall Use |
Show More
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Shell Command Execution
Shell Command Execution
This section lists Windows shell commands that are run by the samples in this family. Windows Shell commands are often leveraged by malware for nefarious purposes and can be used to elevate security privileges, download and launch other malware, exploit vulnerabilities, collect and exfiltrate data, and hide malicious activity.
"powershell.exe" -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Enc 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