Backdoor.MSIL.Agent.GTE
Threat Scorecard
EnigmaSoft Threat Scorecard
EnigmaSoft Threat Scorecards are assessment reports for different malware threats which have been collected and analyzed by our research team. EnigmaSoft Threat Scorecards evaluate and rank threats using several metrics including real-world and potential risk factors, trends, frequency, prevalence, and persistence. EnigmaSoft Threat Scorecards are updated regularly based on our research data and metrics and are useful for a wide range of computer users, from end users seeking solutions to remove malware from their systems to security experts analyzing threats.
EnigmaSoft Threat Scorecards display a variety of useful information, including:
Popularity Rank: The ranking of a particular threat in EnigmaSoft’s Threat Database.
Severity Level: The determined severity level of an object, represented numerically, based on our risk modeling process and research, as explained in our Threat Assessment Criteria.
Infected Computers: The number of confirmed and suspected cases of a particular threat detected on infected computers as reported by SpyHunter.
See also Threat Assessment Criteria.
| Threat Level: | 60 % (Medium) |
| Infected Computers: | 1 |
| First Seen: | June 22, 2026 |
| Last Seen: | June 24, 2026 |
| OS(es) Affected: | Windows |
Backdoor.MSIL.Agent.GTE is the detection name EnigmaSoft's SpyHunter assigns to a .NET (MSIL) backdoor sample analyzed through the AMAS automated malware-analysis system. A backdoor is malware whose core purpose is to give an attacker covert remote access to an infected computer — a foothold that can be used to run commands, steal data, deploy additional payloads, or fold the machine into a larger operation. The "Agent" portion of the name indicates a generic signature: the file behaves like a backdoor and is built on Microsoft's .NET framework, but it is not tied here to one specific, publicly named malware family.
Everything below is based on the real characteristics of the analyzed sample plus well-established public knowledge of the .NET backdoor category. No specific first-seen date, geographic distribution, engine detection ratio, or command-and-control address is asserted, because that intelligence is not available for this generic detection — only the verifiable file and behavior data are.
Table of Contents
What Is Backdoor.MSIL.Agent.GTE?
Backdoors built in MSIL/.NET are popular with attackers because the framework is present on virtually every modern Windows system, the language is quick to develop in, and compiled assemblies are easy to obfuscate and repackage. A .NET backdoor typically opens a channel back to an operator, waits for instructions, and carries out whatever the operator sends — downloading files, executing programs, harvesting credentials, or capturing user data. Because "Agent.GTE" is a generic classification, files under this name share a malicious backdoor role rather than an identical code base.
How Backdoor.MSIL.Agent.GTE Spreads
.NET backdoors of this type are commonly delivered through phishing email attachments and malicious links, trojanized or "cracked" software, fake updates, and loaders dropped by earlier-stage infections. They may also arrive bundled inside seemingly harmless utilities. Once executed, the assembly runs under the .NET runtime and attempts to blend in with legitimate managed processes.
Technical Analysis and Behavior
The analyzed sample is a 55,296-byte (54 KB) 32-bit (x86) Windows executable identified as a .NET (MSIL) assembly. It is not packed with a traditional runtime packer and is not digitally signed. During automated sandbox analysis the sample exhibited three notable behavior categories: it reads user files and personal data on the machine, it uses anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques to resist inspection, and it uses encryption or obfuscation routines to conceal its data or payload — behavior consistent with a backdoor that protects its configuration and any information it exfiltrates. In this run the sample did not record file-system modifications or registry persistence, but backdoors frequently establish persistence only after receiving operator instructions, so a quiet sandbox run should not be read as harmless.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
The values below reflect one analyzed sample; specific indicators rotate between builds, so treat them as representative rather than exhaustive.
- SHA-256:
1d0b82b5a1fb03f950d23e341edd2664d128aacd611bf9911965c81147e1d7e9 - SHA-1:
fb5ef373ffefc61bc1391535613a1ff04ba5b13a - MD5:
bf4c59898e5d38a246b77f6c3893c543 - File size: 55,296 bytes
- Traits: .NET (MSIL) assembly, 32-bit (x86), unsigned
Detection Heuristics
Backdoor.MSIL.Agent.GTE is a heuristic verdict reached by analyzing the managed (.NET) code and its runtime behavior rather than by matching a single known family. Contributing signals include the assembly's use of encryption/obfuscation, active anti-debugging measures, access to user data, and structural patterns in the MSIL that resemble known backdoor scaffolding. Because .NET assemblies can be decompiled, analysts and engines often key on suspicious method and type patterns, embedded encrypted blobs, and calls that set up remote communication. The generic "Agent" label reflects that these traits are shared across many unrelated .NET backdoors.
Digital Forensics
When triaging a suspected infection, look for an unsigned ~54 KB .NET executable in temporary directories, the user profile, or a startup location. Because .NET backdoors commonly persist and communicate only on command, inspect autorun points (the Run/RunOnce registry keys and Scheduled Tasks), review outbound network connections from unexpected managed processes, and examine the .NET assembly with a decompiler to recover embedded strings, configuration, and any encrypted resources. The Windows Prefetch folder and application/PowerShell logs can confirm execution and any spawned child processes.
Symptoms of Infection
Backdoors are designed to be stealthy, so overt symptoms may be minimal. Possible signs include unexplained network activity, unfamiliar processes running under the .NET runtime, security tools being disabled, sudden appearance of new files or scheduled tasks, and evidence that accounts or data have been accessed. The absence of symptoms is common and does not indicate the machine is clean.
How to Remove Backdoor.MSIL.Agent.GTE
1. Disconnect and scan. Because a backdoor implies remote access, disconnect the machine from the network, then install and update SpyHunter and run a full system scan to detect and remove Backdoor.MSIL.Agent.GTE and anything it may have pulled down.
2. Boot into Safe Mode with Networking if the threat resists removal, and repeat the scan.
3. Remove persistence. After scanning, review Scheduled Tasks and the Run/RunOnce registry keys for entries pointing to unfamiliar executables and delete them.
4. Reset browsers in case credentials or sessions were exposed:
- Chrome: Settings > Reset settings > Restore settings to their original defaults.
- Firefox: Help > More troubleshooting information > Refresh Firefox.
- Edge: Settings > Reset settings > Restore settings to their default values.
- Android: uninstall unknown recently installed apps and clear browser site data.
5. Change your passwords from a known-clean device, since the sample accessed user data and a backdoor can capture credentials; enable multi-factor authentication where possible.
Why Backdoor.MSIL.Agent.GTE Is a Serious Risk
The danger of a backdoor lies in what it enables after installation rather than in the initial file itself. Once an operator has a channel into the machine, a compact 54 KB loader like this one can pull down and run far larger and more damaging tools on demand — information stealers that harvest saved browser passwords and cryptocurrency wallets, keyloggers, ransomware, or modules that turn the device into part of a botnet. Because the sample already demonstrated the ability to read user data and to conceal information with encryption, any credentials, documents, or session tokens present on the system should be treated as potentially exposed. A backdoor also undermines trust in the whole machine: an attacker with remote command execution can create new user accounts, disable defenses, move laterally to other systems on the same network, and re-install themselves if a first cleanup attempt is incomplete. This is why isolating the host from the network and performing a thorough, tool-assisted removal — followed by credential resets from a clean device — is so important for this class of threat.
Prevention
To reduce the risk of .NET backdoors like this one, avoid opening unexpected email attachments and links, do not run cracked or pirated software, keep Windows and the .NET runtime patched, and use a reputable, continuously updated anti-malware product. Enabling multi-factor authentication limits the value of any credentials a backdoor manages to capture.
Conclusion
Backdoor.MSIL.Agent.GTE flags a .NET backdoor — malware built to hand remote control of your computer to an attacker. Even though this sample was quiet in the sandbox, its encryption, anti-analysis behavior, and access to user data mark it as a serious threat that should be removed promptly. A full security scan, removal of any persistence, a password reset, and cautious browsing habits are the right response.
Analysis Report
General information
| Family Name: | Backdoor.MSIL.Agent.GTE |
|---|---|
| Signature status: | No Signature |
Known Samples
Known Samples
This section lists other file samples believed to be associated with this family.|
MD5:
bf4c59898e5d38a246b77f6c3893c543
SHA1:
fb5ef373ffefc61bc1391535613a1ff04ba5b13a
SHA256:
1D0B82B5A1FB03F950D23E341EDD2664D128AACD611BF9911965C81147E1D7E9
File Size:
55.30 KB, 55296 bytes
|
Windows Portable Executable Attributes
- File doesn't have "Rich" header
- File doesn't have exports table
- File doesn't have security information
- File is .NET application
- File is 32-bit executable
- File is either console or GUI application
- File is GUI application (IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_GUI)
- File is not packed
- IMAGE_FILE_DLL is not set inside PE header (Executable)
- IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE is set inside PE header (Executable Image)
File Icons
File Icons
This section displays icon resources found within family samples. Malware often replicates icons commonly associated with legitimate software to mislead users into believing the malware is safe.
Windows PE Version Information
Windows PE Version Information
This section displays values and attributes that have been set in the Windows file version information data structure for samples within this family. To mislead users, malware actors often add fake version information mimicking legitimate software.| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| Assembly Version | 1.0.0.0 |
| File Description | GFPandora Fix Error |
| File Version | 1.0.0.0 |
| Internal Name | GFPandora Fix Error.exe |
| Legal Copyright | Copyright © 2026 |
| Original Filename | GFPandora Fix Error.exe |
| Product Name | GFPandora Fix Error |
| Product Version | 1.0.0.0 |
File Traits
- .NET
- x86
Block Information
Block Information
During analysis, EnigmaSoft breaks file samples into logical blocks for classification and comparison with other samples. Blocks can be used to generate malware detection rules and to group file samples into families based on shared source code, functionality and other distinguishing attributes and characteristics. This section lists a summary of this block data, as well as its classification by EnigmaSoft. A visual representation of the block data is also displayed, where available.| Total Blocks: | 102 |
|---|---|
| Potentially Malicious Blocks: | 53 |
| Whitelisted Blocks: | 49 |
| Unknown Blocks: | 0 |
Visual Map
? - Unknown Block
x - Potentially Malicious Block
Windows API Usage
Windows API Usage
This section lists Windows API calls that are used by the samples in this family. Windows API usage analysis is a valuable tool that can help identify malicious activity, such as keylogging, security privilege escalation, data encryption, data exfiltration, interference with antivirus software, and network request manipulation.| Category | API |
|---|---|
| User Data Access |
|
| Anti Debug |
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| Encryption Used |
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