Hacktool.ConnectWiseControl.A
Threat Scorecard
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Popularity Rank: The ranking of a particular threat in EnigmaSoft’s Threat Database.
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See also Threat Assessment Criteria.
| Popularity Rank: | 341 |
| Threat Level: | 50 % (Medium) |
| Infected Computers: | 1,192 |
| First Seen: | July 19, 2025 |
| Last Seen: | October 8, 2026 |
| OS(es) Affected: | Windows |
Hacktool.ConnectWiseControl.A is a heuristic detection that flags builds of the legitimate ConnectWise Control remote-support product—the tool still widely known by its former name, ScreenConnect—when they turn up in contexts that suggest abuse rather than sanctioned IT administration. The binary itself is genuine, digitally signed remote-monitoring-and-management (RMM) software, which is precisely what makes the detection important: attackers have discovered that a trusted, code-signed remote-access agent sails past defenses that would instantly quarantine conventional malware.
Because the file is a dual-use “hacktool” rather than a self-propagating virus, Hacktool.ConnectWiseControl.A is best understood as a risk indicator. On a managed workstation it may be entirely expected; on an endpoint where no one authorized remote support, it is frequently the first visible sign that an intruder has established interactive control. This report explains what the detection means, how the underlying tool is weaponized, what our analyzed sample did in a sandbox, and how to investigate and remove it safely.
Table of Contents
What Is Hacktool.ConnectWiseControl.A?
ConnectWise Control (ScreenConnect) is a commercial RMM platform used by managed service providers and internal help desks to deliver unattended remote sessions, transfer files, run commands, and push follow-on software. Those same capabilities—persistent unattended access, file transfer, and arbitrary command execution—are exactly what a remote attacker wants after gaining a foothold. The “Hacktool” prefix signals that the object is legitimate technology being tracked because of its potential for misuse, not a trojan in the traditional sense.
The analyzed sample is a 4,514,696-byte (~4.3 MB) Windows executable that is authentically code-signed. The signing certificate is issued to ConnectWise, LLC and chains to the DigiCert Trusted Root G4 certificate authority, and the file carries a valid signature state. In other words, this is real ConnectWise software, not a forged imposter—which is why signature-only trust models are a poor defense here. Behavioral clustering during analysis matched the ConnectWiseControl.A family with roughly 60% similarity, consistent with a standard ScreenConnect client build.
How It Spreads / Distribution
ConnectWise Control does not spread on its own. It is deployed—either legitimately by administrators or maliciously by an operator who already has a way onto the machine. Public reporting from CISA and multiple vendors documents a sharp, sustained rise in adversarial use of RMM tools as an initial-access and persistence mechanism. The dominant delivery pattern is social engineering: spear-phishing emails and fake “IT alert” or “refund/support” lures that trick a user into launching a pre-configured client or clicking an invite link that stitches the endpoint straight into an attacker-controlled relay.
Since 2025, researchers have also documented trojanized and stripped-down ScreenConnect installers—including ClickOnce-style runners—used to convert a trusted remote-admin tool into a stealthy foothold that then drops additional remote-access trojans for redundancy. ConnectWise Control is frequently observed alongside other RMM utilities and commodity RATs, a deliberate “belt-and-suspenders” tactic so that removing one channel does not evict the intruder. Ransomware affiliates, initial-access brokers, and APT crews have all been tied to this technique, which maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1219: Remote Access Tools.
Technical Analysis & Behavior
Sandbox execution of the representative sample produced a behavior profile that blends normal installer activity with traits an analyst should scrutinize. AMAS grouped its runtime actions into five categories: user_data_access, anti_debug, encryption_used, process_manipulation_evasion, and a general other_suspicious bucket. That combination is coherent for a remote-support agent: it enumerates and reads user/session data to broker a remote view, it protects its own session traffic with cryptography, and it manages child processes to launch the control client.
Static traits reinforce the picture. The file is a managed .NET x86 image that carries an Installer Version resource and references the RijndaelManaged AES implementation, the ntdll native layer, and bundled dll components. It also exhibits HighEntropy sections—expected for a packaged, compressed installer and for its encrypted configuration—yet no discrete third-party packer was identified. The PE header shows nine notable characteristic flags. The concern is not that these behaviors are inherently malicious; it is that a valid ConnectWise agent bundling AES routines, anti-analysis checks, and process control gives an operator a full interactive foothold under a trusted signature.
Indicators of Compromise
The following indicators come from a single analyzed sample. Treat them as representative, not exhaustive: ConnectWise Control is redistributed in countless per-instance builds, so hashes and configuration values rotate between deployments, and the presence of a legitimately signed agent is itself the primary indicator rather than any one file hash.
- SHA-256: 63928352386C7BDBA4B9864DF23CCD24E7487FACB5C35E316639D70E566480CA
- SHA-1: 444010218c7b6b741ac9b62e2f9a09b8405aeb78
- MD5: 14de216fc9198bb49a3cc91225d2f86c
- File size: 4,514,696 bytes (~4.3 MB)
- Digital signature: signed by ConnectWise, LLC, chaining to DigiCert Trusted Root G4 (valid signature)
- Type/traits: .NET x86 installer, HighEntropy sections, RijndaelManaged (AES) references, no third-party packer
During detonation the sample recorded 9 registry modifications and 1 file-system write—counts consistent with a client that registers itself and stages its session configuration rather than sprawling across the disk.
Detection Heuristics
Because the binary is validly signed, engines cannot rely on signature reputation alone. Detection of Hacktool.ConnectWiseControl.A is driven by policy and behavior: identifying the ConnectWise Control client family by its .NET installer structure, embedded configuration, and product metadata, then correlating that with context—was this agent expected on this asset? Heuristic weighting also considers the runtime cluster observed here (anti-debug checks, AES/RijndaelManaged usage, process manipulation, and broad user-data access) and the high-entropy managed image. Family clustering that matched ConnectWiseControl.A at ~60% similarity is the kind of fuzzy fingerprint AMAS uses to group builds despite per-instance differences. The takeaway for defenders: allow-list authorized RMM tooling and alert on any RMM agent outside that list.
Digital Forensics
Investigators should hunt for the artifacts a ScreenConnect client leaves behind. On disk, look for a ConnectWise Control / ScreenConnect client executable or service binary (the sample weighs ~4.3 MB and is signed by ConnectWise, LLC). In the registry, the sample generated 9 modifications—review keys tied to service registration and application configuration, and correlate their timestamps against your change window. Enumerate installed services and scheduled tasks for a ConnectWise/ScreenConnect entry configured for unattended start, since RMM installers commonly create a Windows service for persistence. In running memory and process trees, look for the .NET client spawning child processes (matching the observed process-manipulation behavior) and for outbound sessions to a remote relay. Session and event logs—who connected, when, and what commands or file transfers occurred—are often the most decisive evidence of misuse. The single observed file write and modest registry footprint mean the strongest signal is frequently the mere existence of an unsanctioned, otherwise-legitimate remote-access agent.
Symptoms of Infection
Abuse of ConnectWise Control is designed to be quiet, but tell-tale signs include: an unexpected “ConnectWise Control” or “ScreenConnect” entry in installed programs, services, or the system tray; the cursor moving or windows opening with no one at the keyboard; a remote-support session banner or connection notice you did not initiate; a ConnectWise-signed service starting automatically at boot; unexplained outbound network connections; and secondary tools or scripts appearing shortly after the agent—consistent with an operator staging follow-on payloads. On a machine that was never enrolled with a managed service provider, any of these should be treated as a potential compromise.
How to Remove Hacktool.ConnectWiseControl.A
1. Run a full malware scan. Use SpyHunter to perform a complete system scan. Because attackers routinely pair ConnectWise Control with additional RATs and droppers, let the scanner enumerate the whole disk so it can surface any companion payloads, not just the RMM agent itself, then quarantine everything it flags.
2. Disconnect and preserve evidence. If the agent is unauthorized, isolate the machine from the network to cut the operator's live session before you begin removal, and—if this is a business asset—capture logs first for incident response.
3. Uninstall the agent and stop its service. Boot into Safe Mode with Networking, open Services and stop any ConnectWise Control / ScreenConnect service, then remove the program via Settings > Apps > Installed apps. Delete leftover client files and remove the associated service/scheduled-task and configuration registry entries created during install.
4. Clean affected browsers. Remote-access lures often ride in through the browser, so clear residual redirects and permissions:
- Chrome: Settings > Reset settings > Restore settings to their original defaults; review Site Settings > Notifications and remove unknown allowances; remove unrecognized extensions.
- Firefox: Help > More troubleshooting information > Refresh Firefox; review Settings > Privacy & Security > Permissions; remove unknown add-ons.
- Edge: Settings > Reset settings > Restore settings to their default values; check Cookies and site permissions > Notifications; remove suspicious extensions.
- Android: Uninstall any unknown remote-support or “screen share” app, revoke Accessibility and Device-admin permissions granted to it, and clear the default browser's site data; if problems persist, boot into Safe Mode to remove stubborn apps.
5. Rotate credentials and verify. Assume anything typed or stored during the unauthorized session was exposed—change passwords (from a clean device), enable multi-factor authentication, and re-scan to confirm the endpoint is clean. Manual removal is viable for the agent alone, but any host that hosted an intruder session should be rebuilt when its integrity cannot be assured.
Conclusion
Hacktool.ConnectWiseControl.A is not a broken or forged file—it is legitimate, ConnectWise-signed ScreenConnect software flagged because that legitimacy is exactly what adversaries exploit. Judge it by context: an authorized help-desk tool on a managed device is normal, while the same agent on an unenrolled endpoint is a strong indicator of remote compromise and a likely precursor to additional payloads. Investigate how it arrived, hunt for companion tooling, remove it with a full scan and careful manual cleanup, and rotate credentials for any host where an unauthorized remote session may have occurred.
Analysis Report
General information
| Family Name: | Hacktool.ConnectWiseControl.A |
|---|---|
| Signature status: | Self Signed |
Known Samples
Known Samples
This section lists other file samples believed to be associated with this family.|
MD5:
14de216fc9198bb49a3cc91225d2f86c
SHA1:
444010218c7b6b741ac9b62e2f9a09b8405aeb78
SHA256:
63928352386C7BDBA4B9864DF23CCD24E7487FACB5C35E316639D70E566480CA
File Size:
4.51 MB, 4514696 bytes
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MD5:
85838f1201603cccf122bf0f0ba27297
SHA1:
18f21c71aae6d3347f3a33a106aa686174703c0d
SHA256:
D3765565689817C82DC9E613008F353B00946AA454B09DCE03580E286FACFF78
File Size:
2.58 MB, 2579512 bytes
|
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MD5:
ca4ebafbdd125311a0441f3263969825
SHA1:
351390dd44dff517cd25d91c8fca90dab217ecbb
SHA256:
02B6A0CA66F4410CFEFDA7C7C87C279CE69F45FBF14A3A7253A12F4C930193B0
File Size:
3.79 MB, 3787320 bytes
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MD5:
13acdce6ec0843bc8cefdbf007b10870
SHA1:
09d6d130004a2701b5f043a51ba7a127b2a9a27d
SHA256:
1682B94E521E0B14C6EB2D363A1E1C130DBD199CFA1ED3DB1171F70D273079FE
File Size:
2.51 MB, 2508344 bytes
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MD5:
5d0da2130c4266ffcdf4175416fdf660
SHA1:
7a6fe0585fd951decb206796e553bfd1e3791ef2
SHA256:
F76E1764314366A86E3EC8256C14381B297F02F0F873467305266E13D8C873EF
File Size:
2.50 MB, 2502992 bytes
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MD5:
be9a68816dd01cb01070a79bec487e8a
SHA1:
16edde57e5d7687ad2c5d3894d7742199fe5223c
SHA256:
3D87E2FFAEF77333A4492074469FB89131FAD4876F15047D60651614F4797227
File Size:
2.58 MB, 2579512 bytes
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MD5:
8a2de3838cf7cd5c8fb45ddc8121b823
SHA1:
096f1c1711519fbb56c280c49c61d3656b6ccc54
SHA256:
0F7FD6A4BD47493372E6AB9AA3FAC68536B6E97AE12F873D75F0DBBA4C465071
File Size:
2.58 MB, 2579512 bytes
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MD5:
75475dc5ec9ef943444cb245ad6f64b8
SHA1:
ec9428c5160f030d018b6823c9e8229eecbfa11b
SHA256:
8FC80E4F5EB5D77F7A358E3A4559C101901B4C33140CBC1AAD734AB619F8EADE
File Size:
2.51 MB, 2507832 bytes
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MD5:
0acbef3e13d84b113b0ac6be909f887a
SHA1:
60cbec2255bc1681d01112b638d2a8e9ae842ac3
SHA256:
8D81C435487A0D5B6EA5C046EFCC86D1E5F9F0D6912C9B876D99131AEF26DDCB
File Size:
2.50 MB, 2502992 bytes
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MD5:
459bc7f166ddb63e78f3f70b6735a01c
SHA1:
b2787c0be4421c40d8da48ee020453611a6d1d27
SHA256:
E7B2301BB90C6FD4C2AD6CB6712CACC9EE4023F87004D0BFC76322EB30D74680
File Size:
5.45 MB, 5452504 bytes
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MD5:
822014203d7109546ec78bdb3da94de1
SHA1:
a500231289ee8afcdc6ae06ea57fde23025e02e9
SHA256:
AD62746542CEFB6EFBF166988A652DB3742C68CDE197DA0F3E8FEB3137E67764
File Size:
2.51 MB, 2508344 bytes
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MD5:
693706c48241259144cdbd9e5b28b4ac
SHA1:
61bb20da9f4365f6ca7142ca7a0c440a7e7ca755
SHA256:
779CC3F81372B632E2736AFBE054E52B9A10C4A313ED01C60E010625E40B2926
File Size:
2.58 MB, 2579512 bytes
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MD5:
a2dcd3d963f969c65c72bd3e1d43f088
SHA1:
95635a841c80d30cc3d43b3f3e1da5137ee2ef76
SHA256:
E4484FE39AA3D904B11FF7214D001B1BC4FA05787F871585E46BEFDEE67BCB26
File Size:
2.58 MB, 2579512 bytes
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MD5:
16134d7dcec52becf1d8afe6e4416893
SHA1:
a174ecdb2beae73ff8e2e406b100749fe4fb41a2
SHA256:
F14AAFD21C00A5F9DC5D5319C7C4200BC33D2B69CAAC1F61BA6DD43D5338AD06
File Size:
2.50 MB, 2504016 bytes
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MD5:
56b4a063090bfa00dfc1aac2e8f3c0d3
SHA1:
a3730d102be2ca1628364eef250edb7dc5d3da42
SHA256:
51B4E13A3F0C3DF00C19D7F11C0989B712EF907DBEA08B88F7C381577DDB6EE7
File Size:
2.51 MB, 2508344 bytes
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MD5:
e3e267d36293bcef19b071e61192ab0b
SHA1:
8c5100273ec7fb7d6549d27a374c7a4b5a942a92
SHA256:
CB4B3046AA2622FAC75E389CD11DC97FE760FB34EAC367E811B52F3999F80B0D
File Size:
3.90 MB, 3901752 bytes
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MD5:
9008b2511e1fcfed0004d19a0b8435dc
SHA1:
92189314a832b2fd097847d7e544c8edd9a25b38
SHA256:
0C2FADA4A3E1321DCBD659C19912B03DFA5921E05AB35E95443C6EC10D4738F4
File Size:
2.58 MB, 2575416 bytes
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MD5:
c01a51e3600610781be9924230e6436b
SHA1:
4aab6a54957993e6f696e73c7a6ee7e75df0faf0
SHA256:
37637464BE4C2236858CF86438299EC8DCC1802E76F40B15556C2B35620DDFCE
File Size:
2.58 MB, 2579512 bytes
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MD5:
809b1c4c24204e37a9b284dd33d83c42
SHA1:
de283dd03dd2d57ccbdf3bd651b2fca10e04ae05
SHA256:
34A274CCA038F5A568398708E695BDB430425FE687B88D1C4AE560624289766B
File Size:
2.58 MB, 2581560 bytes
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MD5:
6ddcb3f9cea0b6eb885b14d31e391c9b
SHA1:
409fc271f0e352609b95caeacbb94b7e2460770f
SHA256:
F0A80EA826F9707792239A2574E2A960D5994EA5D924C0A4754A5916A0E08FB2
File Size:
5.40 MB, 5399800 bytes
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MD5:
4eb319e082a91744cb7332e09091fdaa
SHA1:
d3e307b232c17a1413273c170606fc44c0fe3d83
SHA256:
E7EF85BDCE818BC5CC8BD5ABF3F7571EE8AE95BD0D8EADDC1151A9C4EC2386FB
File Size:
2.51 MB, 2507320 bytes
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MD5:
91db2eeafdc3729370495e5524ec04ad
SHA1:
f1d6e2ab0c562ed72864700d5e9e3963b2b260d8
SHA256:
D7D6E63076E8834B6DC3FDD6A2F24C4913E7DA793E067A72639ADB2485CBB619
File Size:
2.50 MB, 2504008 bytes
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MD5:
26e8459bda36cc23c855119b7d29916e
SHA1:
7b9b83feef8fdc1f1ba47cf1c99e5ad3c8c117a1
SHA256:
8C29807A32F96C8E46E7ED9A20702255340F77D3DB32E23F5F03DF3163562D9F
File Size:
5.42 MB, 5416760 bytes
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MD5:
20df58953af96007346546275fc5c601
SHA1:
751558a1f2a721d56be0c7a70412a29492a929e3
SHA256:
3C479745C77251EBAAC915A3A5343C86F1599344EC4049F2B604C52F145AD7C6
File Size:
2.58 MB, 2581560 bytes
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MD5:
10d983cba48b70b43da021398076af4b
SHA1:
69167f0262614fe1f305508bba91b43d02ca99f0
SHA256:
3B7F60469157E0465C033A27C56E3270B5C7EAB82116BB33EE1A0EA36715131D
File Size:
2.58 MB, 2581560 bytes
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MD5:
82488326a7d8d1897f832e382778121d
SHA1:
5523d70f0fc58c602c28bc1739343326ec39a85f
SHA256:
1355B29A128D1FBB0065B58118B52F6494AFEDAA64F8C48AAF09E757D5259538
File Size:
2.58 MB, 2575992 bytes
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MD5:
7ae733fc6065a2be1af020f5506f841c
SHA1:
76dc86a240ba3df662158cc6b0cbae71b7d4b900
SHA256:
2B50BBD0264E7704223A30FC53555967A53208188B0A64DEDD5564CA6A152505
File Size:
2.58 MB, 2581560 bytes
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MD5:
ced187c57ed2117c8e8c94f51669f47d
SHA1:
6d769a5ee178ba58f9213e47e4df6885f434d1dc
SHA256:
8E7890CE4EC5F6D42F9D4BC2228E447833E199FE0B849794C3A3EE819057558F
File Size:
3.79 MB, 3787320 bytes
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MD5:
85fa2e2bf156bdeeeec03f96e678b3ec
SHA1:
f2734399e1e306a2aaab0aeb17f9627c5ae2840c
SHA256:
6837B7E6A9A30707D7AF7925896EA2B760ED07D55AB6F1776676F57650E1155B
File Size:
3.79 MB, 3787320 bytes
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MD5:
740845999b4469b3af228fac80d934c7
SHA1:
283ff6cc4f08d01522ee61fc596b7b467656fd62
SHA256:
134A39BE579DE2001F75311E8106BDAED20EDE3EC9EEEEAD14DADC4A22A74528
File Size:
2.58 MB, 2581560 bytes
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MD5:
deeb1360eb035b6784908006be699392
SHA1:
5f0b73c63865e7f596a1dc1c9e89abe5b1bd7005
SHA256:
32501BCDA30D6D34B0FD4E101F20B0CF2E95ED3A4CDCEFF2593A2000145BB25C
File Size:
2.58 MB, 2581560 bytes
|
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MD5:
0e575bcc9caa088812f03fdd47567b44
SHA1:
ac6ca283f7a9607b4031e6080c2612353c895a8a
SHA256:
0BF0FB50EF412305D92423D33B5438ADFC541D819C2F9416C1E60789D3AF6B0D
File Size:
2.58 MB, 2584120 bytes
|
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MD5:
0c9a980479f097f9af250487fcb9e3c6
SHA1:
1dabcf0335772a1d3ffc3b0231cca9a69dff116d
SHA256:
597D7050C4550ED2074AC66392B5223BC9DC8FC8AB89CCF03B7EF710FB5EFE07
File Size:
3.85 MB, 3845968 bytes
|
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MD5:
05b05f70cac99e466e61bda46081dd00
SHA1:
56268c15733f102ba9a95e701de28c46afe0ec6b
SHA256:
40444271E87DC503D9F59CD36CB44903922CB220B9699C4C2DAE4F5F63B28548
File Size:
2.58 MB, 2581560 bytes
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MD5:
29ed32c66df48a8528723a57da418ff5
SHA1:
cdac078b1aa0a011dfd2f02970aca78f471fb11b
SHA256:
4E66EEC9DD027559A9B934E6F5CB8415BA32E5736C0290A21231A2D707F6BD9C
File Size:
2.51 MB, 2508344 bytes
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MD5:
0d7fa78d7fbab42837ac0a22d678a015
SHA1:
c3b26b867abdd6b77351f283508aa8d86f1965a8
SHA256:
D8A57522FF09E9CA357A88D2FB4B837A5AC3A36931234CF547A55AB1B2BF834A
File Size:
3.84 MB, 3842104 bytes
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MD5:
7707434bf4148afc22dbf0533aeb92f5
SHA1:
d179a8ce3c12230b6d3d1bcc3ab4c47379b9aa97
SHA256:
7FAB2792CA388DEA1CE1F4AEDC1A86A0CD40A7365C5713AB5BCD81DB63C948A3
File Size:
3.84 MB, 3842104 bytes
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MD5:
bdf7dd2909740ae32f2a440b6107e35e
SHA1:
0cb2760367cc8e338cf3b6096021369934680a0d
SHA256:
9986DB4BCD64A50D23C3817477C46FEA955B97EAB0927C75576AF8A2DB30381C
File Size:
5.45 MB, 5445672 bytes
|
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MD5:
4d8f4a140fef3057ca0094daf3fa3da7
SHA1:
fa89c0350b40327621584ec74ba2b95ff90aaf84
SHA256:
E3848064E5A42DBDF2B16E9349BB84E480FFC6E08583BA9E183C4B8E29F59AF0
File Size:
2.51 MB, 2507832 bytes
|
|
MD5:
07a6cbb1c7a746b1d26108266a24a590
SHA1:
11d2611dc55ef5ce5ca806634c3c0ab29cf4bd2e
SHA256:
289A48D2BDDE4F01B1C352DBBC9B0572D8AE7166A2467AA4FD503E017F166BEE
File Size:
2.57 MB, 2571320 bytes
|
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MD5:
ed3d1601c4001a55b1483d5bdbffeb26
SHA1:
216b2b3c9d14f2c62de6dbde80829e9841d23f8e
SHA256:
4488834A8C51E44CB1E2D0CB783B92FC0718C483F587E7616AAC8588DE0CE249
File Size:
5.51 MB, 5505824 bytes
|
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MD5:
84f40029299d7c5064554a08d66fe7fb
SHA1:
e6aba477ce93508bf409fbd5b2190a27691ba823
SHA256:
659FE3382BC3E0AABD197700929F8771E941BAEDFB3E7E25129B483F8B58A9CB
File Size:
3.84 MB, 3842104 bytes
|
|
MD5:
0257eb24a5dba2ef0024e7d1b755b131
SHA1:
353fa09f494f3223f36edac3e7b65cefe070d452
SHA256:
035DA95361D007B5DD02F96BEDCFBF8E64BFA846E13D6042329AAF07897E967A
File Size:
2.50 MB, 2504016 bytes
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MD5:
99f79cc93dc8dfce0d9202cdaa07a27a
SHA1:
f623d1f2e43e12a25f630da5bf2299f76603276e
SHA256:
72EBBF5D375215892DB2C48ECB36ACB70608A38E71BBBF48FAC4D9F10E8A5F6A
File Size:
2.51 MB, 2507320 bytes
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MD5:
e4a65f1b771198457ac530b4e9b1554d
SHA1:
12b8ab7210973620be215b4dd295949c38bc8486
SHA256:
35FF6D264AE5E04534BF6C29C396D94B0078B9F1597C5806D1F9B408E0F7DCA9
File Size:
2.58 MB, 2584120 bytes
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MD5:
85159b11e49f929bbcda4d73d0dc2b0a
SHA1:
f7d86392844f0aa355a54fb6fc939557254d3d5d
SHA256:
12A1ED871A8F90292982FB8A666AADB746A1A0DDBA849FCD56BE63C951D1DF17
File Size:
3.84 MB, 3842104 bytes
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MD5:
8a75e055cfd6d13330adf15240e55a5c
SHA1:
e1b86050ac04bd92b69c4119d868056641b45537
SHA256:
6C9FF09AB10A927C3BD37A5282D1B80AC671AE3AA7D2AB890DAE6F90720DA5E0
File Size:
2.50 MB, 2502984 bytes
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MD5:
2e26db0d45a6b484ca22bbdd621209c2
SHA1:
295ceed0c86fc8fdf5a5e8536c57aa501a61f0c6
SHA256:
29E5946AFFE1AF30FC86001C8E0E077DE6FD5EA0AF72F6ADD511726923170583
File Size:
2.58 MB, 2581560 bytes
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MD5:
4fb8b50062a12f581c113db6353d5be6
SHA1:
a2ca458d3733aaa47d7a8b2125b59ebd7908e356
SHA256:
ACB81B98D89B055AE85BF4DB1C7AC2688EA0015B9C0D660289364EF6C1D9D6EB
File Size:
3.84 MB, 3842104 bytes
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MD5:
a552e7f9a875a325ecdba34fd4a239cb
SHA1:
a4e9708dff0ec5eeba613c953aa41afcf21ceb34
SHA256:
77C9782FDF17C00610E928E0F12A34E27D0EDF8A37089D6C62E3779A9F058979
File Size:
5.44 MB, 5443912 bytes
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Windows Portable Executable Attributes
- File doesn't have "Rich" header
- File doesn't have exports table
- File is 32-bit executable
- File is either console or GUI application
- File is GUI application (IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_GUI)
- File is Native application (NOT .NET application)
- File is not packed
- IMAGE_FILE_DLL is not set inside PE header (Executable)
- IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE is set inside PE header (Executable Image)
Windows PE Version Information
Windows PE Version Information
This section displays values and attributes that have been set in the Windows file version information data structure for samples within this family. To mislead users, malware actors often add fake version information mimicking legitimate software.| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| Company Name | ScreenConnect Software |
| File Description | ScreenConnect Client |
| File Version |
|
| Internal Name | ScreenConnect.Client.exe |
| Original Filename | ScreenConnect.Client.exe |
| Product Name | ScreenConnect |
| Product Version |
|
Digital Signatures
Digital Signatures
This section lists digital signatures that are attached to samples within this family. When analyzing and verifying digital signatures, it is important to confirm that the signature’s root authority is a well-known and trustworthy entity and that the status of the signature is good. Malware is often signed with non-trustworthy “Self Signed” digital signatures (which can be easily created by a malware author with no verification). Malware may also be signed by legitimate signatures that have an invalid status, and by signatures from questionable root authorities with fake or misleading “Signer” names.| Signer | Root | Status |
|---|---|---|
| 6a3d73eaeb245321 | 6a3d73eaeb245321 | Self Signed |
| 9eb64995cd22322c | 9eb64995cd22322c | Self Signed |
| Connectwise, LLC | DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA384 2021 CA1 | Self Signed |
| ConnectWise, LLC | DigiCert Trusted Root G4 | Root Not Trusted |
| GZD-Pty-Ltd | GZD-Pty-Ltd | Self Signed |
Show More
| ScreenConnect Client | ScreenConnect Client | Self Signed |
File Traits
- .NET
- big overlay
- dll
- HighEntropy
- Installer Version
- No Version Info
- ntdll
- RijndaelManaged
- x86
Block Information
Block Information
During analysis, EnigmaSoft breaks file samples into logical blocks for classification and comparison with other samples. Blocks can be used to generate malware detection rules and to group file samples into families based on shared source code, functionality and other distinguishing attributes and characteristics. This section lists a summary of this block data, as well as its classification by EnigmaSoft. A visual representation of the block data is also displayed, where available.| Total Blocks: | 2,872 |
|---|---|
| Potentially Malicious Blocks: | 77 |
| Whitelisted Blocks: | 2,795 |
| Unknown Blocks: | 0 |
Visual Map
? - Unknown Block
x - Potentially Malicious Block
Similar Families
Similar Families
This section lists other families that share similarities with this family, based on EnigmaSoft’s analysis. Many malware families are created from the same malware toolkits and use the same packing and encryption techniques but uniquely extend functionality. Similar families may also share source code, attributes, icons, subcomponents, compromised and/or invalid digital signatures, and network characteristics. Researchers leverage these similarities to rapidly and effectively triage file samples and extend malware detection rules.- ConnectWiseControl.A
Files Modified
Files Modified
This section lists files that were created, modified, moved and/or deleted by samples in this family. File system activity can provide valuable insight into how malware functions on the operating system.| File | Attributes |
|---|---|
| c:\users\user\appdata\local\temp\screenconnect\0827694ed9a6e9ea\setup.msi | Generic Read,Write Data,Write Attributes,Write extended,Append data |
| c:\users\user\appdata\local\temp\screenconnect\0a1cfe17eac896bf\setup.msi | Generic Read,Write Data,Write Attributes,Write extended,Append data |
| c:\users\user\appdata\local\temp\screenconnect\1c115103a96c4a39\setup.msi | Generic Read,Write Data,Write Attributes,Write extended,Append data |
| c:\users\user\appdata\local\temp\screenconnect\3b14ba86e37d1464\setup.msi | Generic Read,Write Data,Write Attributes,Write extended,Append data |
| c:\users\user\appdata\local\temp\screenconnect\bbb25dd667e785e3\setup.msi | Generic Read,Write Data,Write Attributes,Write extended,Append data |
| c:\users\user\appdata\local\temp\screenconnect\c012553d1bc83604\setup.msi | Generic Read,Write Data,Write Attributes,Write extended,Append data |
| c:\users\user\appdata\local\temp\setup.msi | Generic Read,Write Data,Write Attributes,Write extended,Append data |
Registry Modifications
Registry Modifications
This section lists registry keys and values that were created, modified and/or deleted by samples in this family. Windows Registry activity can provide valuable insight into malware functionality. Additionally, malware often creates registry values to allow itself to automatically start and indefinitely persist after an initial infection has compromised the system.| Key::Value | Data | API Name |
|---|---|---|
| HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\internet settings\zonemap::proxybypass | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\internet settings\zonemap::intranetname | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\internet settings\zonemap::uncasintranet | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\internet settings\zonemap::autodetect | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\internet settings\zonemap::proxybypass | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\internet settings\zonemap::intranetname | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\internet settings\zonemap::uncasintranet | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\internet settings\zonemap::autodetect | RegNtPreCreateKey | |
| HKLM\system\controlset001\services\eventlog\application\screenconnect::eventmessagefile | C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\EventLogMessages.dll | RegNtPreCreateKey |
Windows API Usage
Windows API Usage
This section lists Windows API calls that are used by the samples in this family. Windows API usage analysis is a valuable tool that can help identify malicious activity, such as keylogging, security privilege escalation, data encryption, data exfiltration, interference with antivirus software, and network request manipulation.| Category | API |
|---|---|
| User Data Access |
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| Anti Debug |
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| Encryption Used |
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| Other Suspicious |
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| Process Manipulation Evasion |
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