Troj/JadKmem-A
Threat Scorecard
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Ranking: The ranking of a particular threat in EnigmaSoft’s Threat Database.
Severity Level: The determined severity level of an object, represented numerically, based on our risk modeling process and research, as explained in our Threat Assessment Criteria.
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See also Threat Assessment Criteria.
Ranking: | 12,123 |
Threat Level: | 90 % (High) |
Infected Computers: | 1,947 |
First Seen: | June 12, 2013 |
Last Seen: | August 9, 2023 |
OS(es) Affected: | Windows |
Troj/JadKmem-A is a Trojan and the kernel memory infection that is associated with the Chinese bootkit Guntior. Guntior, unlike other bootkits that hijack the I/O path by setting hooks in the miniport driver, hooks the disk class drivers (disk.sys) IRP_MJ_READ and IRP_MJ_WRITE. This approach is not as deep as setting hooks in the miniport driver. Commonly, the I/O path taken for an IRP flows from the storage class driver to the port driver which then interfaces with the miniport driver and back. So the miniport driver lies closer to the hardware than the storage class driver. Bootkits set their hooks in the miniport driver to reach maximum control. In general, hooking at such levels is done to subvert the attempts of security applications to read and write to disk through storage filter drivers. This is to conceal the harmful MBR and instead return a clean view of the MBR when read. The hooks don't actually remain inside the driver that the rootkit drops but rather in an allocated region of kernel memory.
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